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Go Greyhound and Leave the Fourth
Amendment to Us: Florida v. Bostick
The mood towards drugs is changing in this country, and the
momentum is with us .... Drugs are bad, and we're going after
them.
President Ronald Reagan'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Our nation is fighting a "war on drugs."' 2 Though arguably a
metaphorical war, it has quickly assumed the trappings of a conventional military campaign. 3 Life during wartime is often charac1. President's Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, 11 1982 Pun.
PAPERS 1252, 1253 (Oct. 2, 1982).
2. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter DRUG
STRATEGY].

Richard M. Nixon was the first President to declare war on drugs, throwing down the
gauntlet during his first term in the White House. Since then, every U.S. President has
taken part in the battle. See Joyce Price, Nobel Winner, Two Judges Want Drugs Made
Legal, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, § A, at A3.
On September 5, 1989 President Bush addressed the nation in order to announce the
DRUG STRATEGY and urge its immediate adoption by Congress. The DRUG STRATEGY

outlines the Bush Administration's plan for fighting suppliers, pushers, and users and its
language is replete with metaphors of war.
The war motif permeated President Bush's speech announcing the DRUG STRATEGY.
Drugs, he said, are "turning our cities into battle zones" and "sapping our strength as a
nation." President's Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, II
1989 PUB. PAPERS 1136, 1137 (Sept. 5, 1989) [hereinafter Bush Address, Sept. 5, 1989].
The President discussed his strategic "weapons" and offered a plan for their effective use.
Id. at 1138. The weapons, which include "America's Armed Forces," "will intensify our
efforts against drug smugglers on the high seas, in international airspace, and at our borders." Id. President Bush closed his address with this call to action:
If we fight this war as a divided nation, then the war is lost. But if we face this
evil as a nation united, this will be nothing but a handful of useless chemicals.
Victory-victory over drugs-is our cause, a just cause. And with your help,
we are going to win.
Id. at 1140.
3. The President has even installed a "Drug Czar," the Administration's nickname
for the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. See Charles B. Rangel,
Our NationalDrug Policy, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 52 (1989). The repressive ideology of William Bennett, the country's first Drug Czar, is exemplified by the following
nationally televised exchange:
CALLER: My question is to Mr. Bennett. Why build prisons? Get tough like
Arabia. Behead the damned drug dealers. We're just too darned soft.
BENNETT: It's actually-there's an interesting point. One of the things that I
think is a problem is that we are not doing enough that is morally proportional
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terized by a sudden expansion of government power at the expense
of the individual citizen's constitutional rights.4 Although the tactics of the drug war vary from city to city, 5 one common theme
resounds: a majority of Americans are willing to forego some civil
liberties in order to make a significant dent in the country's drug
problem.6
to the nature of the offense. I mean, what the caller suggests is morally plausible. Legally, it's difficult. But say-LARRY KING: Behead?
BENNETt: Yeah. Morally I don't have any problem with that.
The Larry King Show (CNN television broadcast, June 15, 1989), quoted in Crackmire,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1989, at 7.
Commenting on Bennett's approach to the drug problem, Lewis H. Lapham wrote:
I am reminded of the Ayatollah Khalkhali, appointed by the authorities in
Iran to the office of executioner without portfolio. Khalkhali was blessed with
the power to order the death of anybody found in the company of drugs, and
within a period of seven weeks he killed 176 people. Still he failed to suppress
the use of opium, and he said, "If we wanted to kill everybody who had five
grams of heroin, we would have to kill 5,000 people." And then, after a wistful
pause, he said, "And this would be difficult."
Lewis H. Lapham, A PoliticalOpiate, HARPER'S, Dec. 1989, at 43, 47; see also Jerome H.
Skolnick, A CriticalLook at the National Drug Control Strategy, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV.

75 (1990) (criticizing the Bush

DRUG STRATEGY

for poorly framing the drug issues

that face the nation and for implementing the "semi-martial state" to attack the drug
problem).
4. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of an executive order that led to mass incarceration of Japanese-Americans); see
also Roger W. Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the Need for a
New Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 813 (1987) (contending that the government's exclusion of the press from the Grenada invasion was a constitutionally suspect
prior restraint on publication); Recent Developments in the Law-The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1134 (1972) ("[T]he political
branches,.... characteristically have overestimated threats to national security-to the
detriment of civil liberties.").
5. See John Leo, Chipping Away at Civil Liberties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
26, 1989, at 61 (noting the following regional strategies as examples of the various warlike tactics: landlords lawfully evicted apartment dwellers in Alexandria, Virginia based
solely on suspicion of criminal activity; police in Chicago, Illinois conducted warrantless
sweeps of public housing facilities absent tenant consent; and legislators in Minnesota
enacted a law that allows doctors to test some pregnant women for drugs without their
knowledge).
6. Richard Lacayo, A Threat to Freedom?; Civil Liberties Could Be a Casualty of
Bush's War on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28 (citing a September 1989 Washington
Post-ABC News poll that found 62% of those questioned would willingly forego "a few
of the freedoms we have in this country" to make significant headway in the drug war);
see also Richard Morin, Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not StringentEnough; Mandatory
Drug Tests, Searches Backed, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1989, § A, at AI (reporting that most
of the adults questioned were willing to go far beyond the framework of the President's
DRUG STRATEGY to fight the drug problem). Despite the apparent anti-drug zeal
demonstrated by the overall poll results, 85% of those surveyed agreed that "very few
would be willing to join a community group to reduce the problem." Lacayo, supra, at
28.
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Florida v. Bostick

In Broward County, Florida, the expansion of police power is
typified by the suspicionless bus sweep. As part of their daily routine, members of the Broward County Sheriff's Department board
interstate buses and trains at random stops, asking passengers for
identification and permission to conduct luggage searches.7 The
United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
this practice in Florida v. Bostick." In a six-to-three decision,9 the
Court held that police, without articulable suspicion, can board
buses and randomly ask passengers for identification, tickets, and
permission to search luggage.' 0 The Court declared that such
searches are not per se unconstitutional provided that the passengers give their individual consent.1"
This Note first traces the developments in Fourth Amendment
law that paved the way for the Bostick decision, examining the
Supreme Court cases that have shaped the current definitions of
"seizure" and "consent"-the linchpins of the Bostick case. Next,
the Note reviews the facts and procedural history leading to the
Bostick decision. It then analyzes the underlying rationale of both
the majority and minority opinions. Finally, the Note assesses the
impact that the Bostick decision will have on future encounters between law enforcement officials and private citizens. The Note
concludes that because of the Bostick Court's willingness to compromise civil liberties in the name of a drug war, the public can
reasonably expect police behavior to become more intrusive as the
Bush Administration's metaphorical war continues.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment does not protect people from all
searches and seizures-only unreasonable ones. 2 Before a seizure
7. Supreme Court to Take Up Police Searches of Interstate Trains-Buses, UPI, Oct. 9
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file.
8. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
9. See infra notes 97 and 124.
10. Bostick, III S. Ct. at 2389.
11. Id.
12. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that unlawful intrusion by state agents
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
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can be deemed unreasonable, a court must determine that a seizure
actually occurred. 13 Encounters between police and private citizens trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny only after a seizure has
taken place.' 4
A.

Lawful Seizures

Fully aware that police officers and citizens encounter each
other in a variety of day-to-day situations, 5 the United States
Supreme Court has been careful not to define "seizure" too precisely.' 6 Clearly, an arrest is a Fourth Amendment seizure.17
Short of an arrest, however, classification of the police-citizen encounters that constitute seizures is less obvious.
In Terry v. Ohio,'" the Court made its first attempt to define
"seizure." In Terry, the police officer, a thirty-nine-year veteran of
the force, accosted three men he thought were behaving in a suspicious manner.' 9 To ensure his own safety, the officer patted down
each of the men for weapons; his search produced two revolvers.2"
The officer then arrested the men.2
The issue that reached the Supreme Court was whether the officer's pat-down and subsequent search for weapons violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of Terry, one of the men searched.22
The Court recognized that a police officer seizes a citizen whenever
the officer "accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away."' 23 Although the Court was quick to conclude that a seizure
643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in a state court).
13. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("Our first task is to establish at what
point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when [the officer seized the suspect].").
14. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("If there is no
detention-no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then no constitutional rights have been infringed."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553
(1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) ("[N]ot every encounter between a police officer
and a citizen is an intrusion requiring objective justification.").
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
16. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
17. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(a), at 387-88 (2d ed. 1987).
18. 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968).
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 7-8.
22. Id. at 8. The exclusionary rule, a judicially-created remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, provides that evidence illegally obtained may not be introduced at the
criminal trial of a person who has standing to object. I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 78 (student ed. 1985).

23.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary offers the
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had occurred, 24 the issue of reasonableness spawned a lengthy discussion by Chief Justice Warren. 2 ' Balancing the safety of both the
police and citizens against the individual's right to be free from
intrusive law enforcement procedures, the Terry Court held that a
police officer may constitutionally conduct a brief stop-and-frisk
when that officer has an articulable suspicion that the person
stopped engaged in criminal activity.26
Thus, the Terry Court's definition of a seizure consists of two
prongs: the officer must (1) accost the individual, and (2) restrain
that person's freedom to walk away.27 It is the scope of the second
prong that generates constitutional controversies. According to
Terry, an individual's liberty may be restrained in one of two ways,
through sheer physical force or by a more subtle show of authority
by a police officer.28
United States v. Mendenhal129 provided the Court with its first
opportunity to discuss a seizure that was the product of a more
subtle display of authority. In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart announced a new test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment
seizure has taken place. 30 First, a court should examine the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the challenged incident. 3 1 Second, the court should decide whether a reasonable person in the
following definitions for "accost": to approach and speak to; to confront, usually in a
somewhat challenging or defensive way; to address abruptly and usually with a certain
degree of impetuosity or boldness; to solicit. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY 12 (1961). The Terry Court did not define the term.
24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Id. at 30-31. Although the Terry Court did not explicitly define "articulable suspicion," it held that a police officer may conduct a stop-and-frisk when he "observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous .... " Id. at 30.
Probable cause to arrest exists when, at the time of the arrest, "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had
committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (citing
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)); cf Thomas S. Kiriakos, Comment, FourthAmendment Rights of Persons Present When a Search WarrantIs Executed.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IOWA L. REV. 453, 458-59 (1981) (concluding that the line between
articulable suspicion and probable cause often is a blurry one).
27. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-19.
28. Id. at 19 n.16.
29. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
30. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court, but only Justice Rehnquist
joined that part of the Stewart opinion outlining the new test. Id. at 546 (opinion of
Stewart, J.).
31. Id. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
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same situation would believe that he or she was free to leave.32
In explaining this test, Justice Stewart noted several non-exclusive factors that might suggest a seizure had taken place, even
when the "seized" person made no attempt to leave. These factors
include: (1) the threatening presence of more than one law enforcement official; (2) a display of weaponry by the police; (3)
physical contact initiated by the officer; and (4) a tone of voice by
the officer indicating required compliance with the request.3a
Subsequent Court decisions eventually accepted the Mendenhall
test. In Florida v. Royer,34 a four-justice plurality adopted Justice
Stewart's standard,3" concluding that a suspected drug courier's
consent was tainted by an illegal detention. 36 The Royer plurality
noted that there is no litmus test for determining the point at
which a consensual encounter becomes a seizure. 37 Further, one
year after Royer, in INS v. Delgado,38 a six-justice majority embraced the Mendenhall test. 39 Delgado presented the question of
whether factory sweeps by Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") agents in search of illegal aliens involved Fourth Amendment seizures of the factory's workforce. 40 The Court held that the
INS interviews at issue were consensual encounters rather than
Fourth Amendment seizures. 4' According to the Delgado Court,

routine police questioning will seldom rise to the level of a Fourth
Amendment seizure. 42 The Court found that the consensual nature of responses to police questioning is not diminished by the fact
32. Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.).
33. Id. (opinion of Stewart, J.). According to Justice Stewart, absent one of these
factors, otherwise inoffensive police-citizen contact cannot, as a matter of law, amount to
a seizure of that citizen. Id. at 555 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
34. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
35. Id. at 502 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun's dissent also endorsed the Mendenhall test. Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Stewart's test was technically adopted by a majority of the Royer Court.
36. Id. at 507-08 (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion).
38. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
39. Id. at 215. None of the other Justices expressed any disagreement with the use of
the Mendenhall "reasonable person" test. In Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 57374 (1988), the Court explicitly adopted the Mendenhall test.
40. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 211-12.
41. Id. at 221. For a more extensive discussion of Delgado, see Cheryl L. Marsh,
Note, Brief Encounters of the "Alien" Kind -Challenges to Factory Sweeps and Detentive
Questioning: I.N.S. v. Delgado, 15 Sw. U. L. REV. 473 (1985); Cristina Navarro, Note,
The Fourth Amendment.- In Search of Illegal Aliens: Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Delgado, 18 AKRON L. REV. 339 (1984); Jill Shorey, Note, Enhancing the
Powers of the INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 38 Sw. L.J. 1039
(1984).
42. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
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that most people are unaware of their right to refuse to cooperate.43
B.

Consent Searches

Police officers regularly rely on consent searches to aid them in
criminal investigations." When the state in a criminal prosecution
attempts to justify a search on the basis of consent, two Fourth
Amendment challenges often are raised by the defendant: (1) that
the defendant's "voluntary" consent was actually the product of
coercion or duress; 45 and (2) that the scope of the search exceeded
the qualified consent actually given.46
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,47 the Court resolved a long-standing debate over the definition of "voluntariness" as applied to consent searches. Before the Bustamonte decision, it was unclear
whether a State's claim48 of voluntary consent required a knowing
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights49 or merely a showing by the
State that the subject freely agreed to the search.50 Although the
Bustamonte Court acknowledged the need to balance effective police questioning with individual liberty and due -process rights,"'
the Court rejected the contention that a voluntary consent must
include a knowing waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.5 2 After
undertaking a Fifth Amendment analysis53 that has been criticized
by many as wholly unpersuasive, 54 the Court noted that a waiver
43.

Id.

3 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 8.1, at 147.
45. 3 id. § 8.1(a), (b), at 149-59.
46. 3 id. § 8.1(c). For a recent examination of qualified consent, see Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 185-87 (1991).
47. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
48. When the State attempts to justify a non-custodial search on the basis of consent,
it has the burden of demonstrating the voluntariness of the consent. Id. at 222.
49. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (finding that entry into the
defendant's room "was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right").
50. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (finding no constitutional viola44.

tion by government's use of business coupons that were voluntarily given to police by
petitioner); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (holding that no Fourth Amendment violation exists when the petitioner agreed to permit inspection of certain business
accounts and records).
51. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225.
52. Id. at 247-49.
53. The Bustamonte Court compared the determination of voluntariness involved in a
consent search with the test used to determine whether a confession was coerced. Id. at
223-34. Justice Marshall observed, however, that coercion and consent are "subtly different concept[s] to which different standards have been applied in the past." Id. at 282
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. See William Kluwin & Joseph Walkowski, Note, Valid Consent to Search Determined by Standard of "Voluntariness"--Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 12 AM. CRIM. L.
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standard typically applies only after the wheels of a criminal prosecution have been set in motion. 5" According to the Bustamonte
Court, Fourth Amendment protections are of an entirely different
order than those rights involved in a criminal prosecution, such as
those that ensure a fair trial.5 6 Justifiably, then, the Court determined that there is no reason to require an officer to issue a Miranda-type warning and to receive a knowing waiver before
undertaking a consent search."
The Court's determination that a voluntary consent does not require an explicit waiver of Fourth Amendment rights begged the
answer to another question: What must the state show before a
consent will be deemed "voluntary"? The Court ruled that voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined by looking at the
totality of the circumstances under which the consent was given. 8
The Bustamonte decision left at least one important issue unresolved. The Court failed to state whether the test for determining the voluntariness of consent requires an "objective" or a
"subjective" analysis. Seven years later, however, the Mendenhall
Court answered the question: the prosecution must prove that the
consent was "in fact voluntary"-the police officer's reasonable belief that the consent was voluntary is not sufficient.5 9
Since it is easier for a police officer to request permission to conduct a search than to swear out a warrant, the consent search will
continue to be a favored tool of law enforcement officials. Likewise, because "consenting" parties often are arrested and convicted, voluntariness challenges will continue to be made by
criminal defendants.' Although the Bustamonte Court held that a
REV. 231 (1974); William R. Sage, Note, CriminalProcedure--Standardsfor Valid Consent to Search, 52 N.C. L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Doctrine of Waiver and Consent
Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891 (1974); Recent Developments, 7 IND. L. REV. 592
(1974).
55. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237.
56. Id. at 241-42. The Court explained that Fourth Amendment protections do not
promote "the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial." Id. at 242.
Some of the rights that cannot be forfeited absent a knowing waiver include: the right
to counsel at trial, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); the right to counsel at the
entering of a guilty plea, Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972); the right to confront witnesses, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); and the right to be free from double jeopardy, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
57. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 242-46.
58. Id. at 248-49. The Court reaffirmed this principle in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210 (1984).
59. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58.
60. During oral argument in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), Justice Marshall commented quizzically on the number of criminals who "freely consent" to
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suspect need not be aware of his right to refuse consent, Mendenhall made it clear that it is the suspect's belief, rather than the
police officer's, that will be dispositive on the issue of voluntariness.
III.
A.

FLORIDA V. BOSTICK

The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions

On August 27, 1985, Officer Steve Rubino and Detective Joe
Nutt, both of the Broward County Sheriff's Department, boarded
a bus on which Terrance Bostick was a ticketed passenger.6" The
two men boarded the vehicle as part of a routine procedure known
as "working the buses."16 2 The department used this tactic to im-

prove drug interdiction efforts in the area.6 3 Although clad in civilian clothing, the officers wore raid jack6ts bearing the official
department insignia."M Detective Nutt displayed a recognizable
weapon pouch containing a gun.65
The bus, en route from Miami to Atlanta, was on a brief stopover in Fort Lauderdale when the officers came aboard.6 6 The
driver, familiar with this procedure, exited the vehicle and closed
the doors behind him.67 With no articulable suspicion,68 the officers moved to the rear of the bus in the direction of Bostick.69
Detective Nutt stood in front of Bostick's seat, partially blocking
the aisle.7 ° Officer Rubino positioned himself nearby.71 Nutt
roused the resting Bostick to get his attention and then fired a volley of questions at him, requesting identification, a bus ticket, and
travel information.72 After explaining to Bostick that members of
the Broward County Sheriff's Department routinely board buses to
hunt for illegal drugs, Detective Nutt asked him for permission to
searches: "It's always interesting to me that all of the drug dealers, when you ask them to
be searched, say 'Sure, come on.'" Justice Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at Oral Argument in Florida v. Bostick (Feb. 26, 1991), reprinted in Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Consenting"
to a Police State, RECORDER, Mar. 1, 1991, at 4.
61. Joint Appendix at *13, Florida v. Bostick, IllS. Ct. 2382 (1991) (No. 89-1717),
available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
62. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1989).
63. Melissa Goodman, A Long Journey: One Case Travels from a Bus in Florida to
the U.S. Supreme Court, LIFE, Fall Special 1991, vol. 14, no. 13, at 78.
64. Joint Appendix at *13, Bostick (No. 89-1717).
65. Id. at *21.
66. Id. at *25.
67. Id. at *90.
68. Id. at *19-*20.
69. Id. at *22.
70. Id. at *50-*51.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *24-*25.
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search a small tote bag on his seat.73 Although Bostick consented,
the record did not establish conclusively whether he was advised
by either officer of his right to refuse the request.74
Finding nothing illegal, Detective Nutt requested permission to
search Bostick's suitcase, which was stored on an overhead rack. 75
Again, the record was unclear as to whether Bostick was ever told
that compliance was optional. 76 The evidence was also inconclusive on the question of whether he consented to the suitcase search.
Nevertheless, implicit in the trial court's decision was the finding
that Bostick did consent and that his consent was valid. 77 The second search yielded nearly one pound of cocaine and prompted Bostick's arrest.78
Bostick moved to suppress the evidence claiming it was the fruit
of an illegal seizure, but the trial judge rejected this argument.79
Bostick entered a plea of nolo contenderes° and was sentenced to
five years in prison.8 The State agreed, however, as part of the
plea bargain, to allow Bostick's attorneys to appeal the ruling on
the motion to suppress.8 2
The Florida District Court of Appeal issued a per curiam opin73. Id. at *31-*32.
74. Bostick, 544 So. 2d at 1154. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
Needless to say, there is conflict in the evidence about whether the defendant
consented to the search of the second bag in which the contraband was found
and as to whether he was informed of his right to refuse consent. However, any
conflict must be resolved in favor of the state, it being a question of fact decided
by the trial judge.
Id. (quoting Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Letts, J.,
dissenting in part)).
75. Joint Appendix at *31, Bostick (No. 89-1717).
76. See supra note 74.
77. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322 (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
78. See Goodman, supra note 63, at 76.
79. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322 (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
80. Nolo contendere is a "[t]ype of plea which may be entered with leave of court to a
criminal complaint or indictment by which the defendant does not admit or deny the
charges, though a fine or sentence may be imposed pursuant to it." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
81. See Goodman, supra note 63, at 78. Terrance Bostick entered prison in October
1986. He was released in early 1989-more than two years before the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the constitutionality of his conviction. Id. at 78-80.
82. Id. at 78. The right to appeal was preserved pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)
(West 1990). Respondent's Brief at 7, Bostick (No. 89-1717). Rule 9.140(b) provides in
pertinent part:
A defendant may not appeal ... from a judgment entered upon a plea of nolo
contendere without an express reservation of the right to appeal from a prior
order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being
reserved.
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b) (West 1990).
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ion affirming the circuit court decision,83 but decided to certify the
following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "May the police
without articulable suspicion board a bus and ask at random, for,
and receive, consent to search a passenger's luggage where they
advise the passenger that he has the right to refuse consent to
search?" 4 Although the appellate court ruled that Bostick's
Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated,8 5 the question it
posed to the Florida Supreme Court suggested that the general
practice of "working the buses" may be unconstitutional.86
B.

The Florida Supreme Court Opinion

The Florida Supreme Court restated the issue in the following
way: "Does an impermissible seizure result when police mount a
drug search on buses during scheduled stops and question boarded
passengers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby obtaining consent to search the passengers' luggage?" 87 The court
maintained that an impermissible seizure does result.88 Because
the officers had no articulable suspicion, 9 the Florida Supreme
Court found that their detention of Bostick was unconstitutional. 9°
Although not expressly applying the Mendenhall test, the court
opined that a reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore
the officers' questions. 91 Indeed, because one of the officers blocked
a significant part of the aisle during the interrogation, the court
found that Bostick was not free to get up and walk away.92 Moreover, as the bus was only in Fort Lauderdale on a short stopover,
83. Bostick v. State, 510 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Although the court
unanimously agreed to certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court, Judge Letts
dissented from that part of the court's decision that denied Bostick's petition for rehearing. Id. at 322 (Letts, J., dissenting in part). Judge Letts reviewed the facts in light of the
relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions, see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text,
and found no applicable bright-line test. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322-24 (Letts, J., dissenting in part). After evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Judge Letts concluded
that the evidence should have been suppressed. Id. at 324 (Letts, J., dissenting in part).
84. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322.
85. Id. Under Florida law, the findings of fact made by a trial court are presumed to
be correct. Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1982). An appellate court may
disturb the trial court's findings only when there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion. Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 1976).
86. Bostick, 510 So. 2d at 322.
87. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989).
88. Id.
89. For a definition of articulable suspicion, see supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
90. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1158.
91. Id. at 1156-57.
92. Id.
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the court suggested that it was impractical for Bostick to leave the
vehicle. 93 Consequently, the court found that the police officers'
detention of Bostick was unconstitutional. 94
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 95 to address
the constitutionality of the per se rule purportedly used by the
Florida Supreme Court to exclude any evidence seized in a suspicionless bus sweep. 96
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
Writing for the majority, 97 Justice O'Connor first acknowledged
the recent nationwide increase in drug interdiction efforts 9" before
turning her attention to Broward County's routine use of suspicionless bus sweeps. O'Connor then restated the Florida Supreme
Court's description of Bostick's encounter, 99 focusing on two facts
accepted by the Florida Supreme Court: (1) that the officers told
Bostick that he could freely refuse consent;" ° and (2) that the officers never threatened Bostick with a gun.°10 The issue before the
Court, O'Connor stated, was whether this type of police
encounter
1 2
necessarily constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. 1
To resolve this issue, the Court first distinguished police encounters that are consensual in nature from those that implicate
the Fourth Amendment, 0 3 citing Terry °' 4 and Royer °5 for the
proposition that a police officer, like a private citizen, is free to
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1158.
95. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), cert. granted, Florida v. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. 241, 241-42 (1990).
96. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (1991). In dissent, however, Justice
Marshall noted that nowhere in its opinion did the Florida Supreme Court claim to apply
a per se rule. Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 2384.
98. Id. at 2384. Some of the tactics used throughout the country include stepped-up
police surveillance, suspicionless stops, and random questioning at airports, train stations, and bus depots. Id.; see supra note 5.
99. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2384-85. In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted this verbatim restatement of the facts. The Florida Supreme Court's careful analysis of the record
convinced him that no per se test was used. Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
infra note 133 and accompanying text.
100. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385. Although Bostick challenged this point, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted the trial court's finding that Bostick had been advised of his right
to refuse consent.. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154-55 (Fla. 1989); see supra note
74; see also supra note 85 (explaining presumptions in Florida factfinding).
101. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385.
102. Id. at 2386.
103. Id. The line between these two types of encounters is crossed when a reasonable
person would no longer feel free to terminate the encounter with the police officer. Id.
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approach an individual in a public place and ask that person if he
or she would be willing to answer some questions. 0 6 In fact, the
Court concluded that Terrance Bostick's encounter would not
have triggered Fourth Amendment analysis if it had occurred in a
bus depot or on the street. 107
The Court then addressed Bostick's contention that a police encounter is much more intimidating on a cramped bus than in an
open depot or a busy airport. 08 Bostick argued that because the
bus passenger is typically seated, with little or no room to move, he
or she is at an immediate disadvantage when approached by a law
enforcement official. 1°9 Bostick maintained that he was seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable person in his situation would not have believed that he was
free to leave the vehicle. 110
The Court, however, was not persuaded by this argument, because it did not accept the threshold inquiry to be whether or not
Bostick felt "free to leave" the Greyhound bus.1 1' That test, the
Court reasoned, is appropriate when a police officer stops an individual who is walking through an airport lobby or down a city
block. 112 Since that person is on the move, compliance with the
officer's request to stop necessarily impedes the individual's movement. The Court distinguished Bostick's encounter from that of
the detained pedestrian, emphasizing the fact that the seated Bostick had no desire to leave the bus.' 11 Justice O'Connor concluded
that because Bostick did not want to leave the vehicle, the Florida
Supreme Court erred in applying the Mendenhall test to gauge the
coerciveness of the encounter." 4
According to the Court, Bostick, a ticketed passenger at a midpoint on his journey, would not have felt free to leave the bus even
if the police had not boarded the vehicle." 5 His movements were
(citing California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991)); see supra notes 29-43 and
accompanying text.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
105. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
106. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
107. Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (holding that a similar
encounter in an airport did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2387.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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not restricted by the police officers; rather, his confinement was
simply "the natural result of his decision to take the bus.""' 6 Finding support for this conclusion in Delgado,"7 the Court stated that
"the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." III
Answering this question requires an evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the encounter.' '9 Justice O'Connor
criticized the Florida Supreme Court for failing to apply a totality
analysis and for deciding the case, instead, based on one fact-that
20
Bostick's encounter took place on a bus.
After announcing the proper test for determining whether Bostick was seized, the Court chose not to reach the merits of the
case.' 2' The Court struck down the Florida Supreme Court's purported use of a per se test, 22 reversed the decision to suppress, and
remanded the matter for an evaluation of the seizure using the
23
proper standard.
D. The Dissent
At the outset, Justice Marshall 24 also acknowledged the nation's
116. Id.
117. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying
text.
118. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387. The assumption that the confining nature of a bus
trip rendered the Mendenhall test inappropriate drew heavily on the Delgado Court's
description of the nature of factory work:
Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by
the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers ....[The conduct of the
INS agents] should have given [the employees] no reason to believe that they
would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or
if they simply refused to answer.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218. The Bostick Court found the Greyhound bus encounter "analytically indistinguishable from Delgado." Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387.
Bostick also contended that he was seized because no reasonable person would consent
to a luggage search knowing the luggage contained cocaine. The Court rejected this argument, however, stating that the "reasonable person" test makes no accommodation for
the "reasonable drug trafficker." Id. at 2388.
119. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387.
120. Id. at 2388.
121. Id. The Court did not reach the merits of Bostick's case because the trial judge
made no express findings of fact. Id.
122. Id.; see supra notes 95-96, 99 and accompanying text.
123. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2388. On remand, the question at issue was whether Bostick freely consented to a luggage search. Id.The Florida Supreme Court, in a 4-3 opinion, ruled that he did. Bostick v. State, 593 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
124. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Bostick, 111 S.
Ct. at 2389.
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ongoing "war on drugs" and the role of law enforcement officials
as footsoldiers in the campaign. 2 ' Marshall cautioned, however,
that effective law enforcement is not the same thing as constitutional law enforcement. ' 26 He launched his attack on suspicionless
27
bus sweeps by recalling the effectiveness of the general warrant.
Although Justice Marshall noted the characteristic lack of articulable suspicion that typifies these dragnet searches,' 2 he suggested that young black males are more likely to be targets of
"random" police encounters than any other group of passengers. 2 9
Unspoken racism, however, is just one of the problems inherent in
suspicionless sweeps, according to Justice Marshall. He was
equally troubled by the totalitarian taint of the practice, likening it
to law enforcement under Hitler or Stalin. 30
125. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.
1989). In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court noted:
Roving patrols, random sweeps, and arbitrary searches or seizures would go far
to eliminate [drug courier activity] in this state. Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia
and Communist Cuba have demonstrated all too tellingly the effectiveness of
such methods. Yet we are not a state that subscribes to the notion that ends
justify means.
Id. at 1158-59.
127. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A general warrant allowed
the officer possessing it to conduct a legal search of a home or business absent any showing of probable cause. The warrant did not specify the goods sought or the places to be
searched. For a thorough discussion of the general warrant, the Star Chamber, and other
precursors to the Fourth Amendment, see NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(1937).
128. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2390 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basis of the decision to single
out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable
than unspeakable."); see United States v. Winston, 711 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1989) (discussing stops of black suspects made by police officers); United States v. Mitchell, 699 F.
Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); see also Gregory L. Young, The Role of Stereotyping
in the Development and Implementation of the D.E.A. Drug Courier Profiles, 15 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 331, 348 (1991) (contending that because travelers are often stopped
based only upon stereotypical characteristics of what a drug trafficker is supposed to look
like, racial and ethnic criteria freely enter the calculus).
130. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall quoted a
powerful passage from another Florida appellate court case involving a Broward County
bus sweep:
"[T]he evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days, under other
flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or railways without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals who held temporary power in the Government. The spectre of American citizens being asked by badge-wielding
police, for identification, travel papers - in short a raison d'etre - is foreign to
any fair reading of the Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties. This
is not Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South
Africa. Yet in Broward County, Florida, these police officers approach every
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While he agreed that the majority's test was the proper analytical tool to use to evaluate the constitutionality of the sweep, Marshall wholly disagreed with the majority's refusal to find that
Bostick was seized in an unreasonable manner.1 3' He saw no need
to remand the matter because he believed that the Florida Supreme
Court applied the test correctly, basing its opinion on a careful exof the facts rather than on the mechanized use of a per
amination
32
se test. 1
The Florida Supreme Court, Marshall explained, carefully analyzed the factual record before reaching its decision. 133 He reasoned that because the question of whether Bostick was "seized"
findings
was a question of law, 134 the Court was free to examine the
1 35
of fact discussed in the Florida Supreme Court opinion.
Applying the "reasonable person" test, Justice Marshall concluded that Bostick's consent was coerced because a reasonable
person in that situation would not have felt free to terminate the
encounter with the armed officers. 36 In support of that conclusion, Marshall stressed the officers' intimidating show of authority,
the impracticability of
their position in front of Bostick's seat, and
37
exiting the bus during a brief stopover.1
According to Justice Marshall, suspicionless bus searches categorically violate the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. 38 Removing this arrow from law enforcement's quiver, he added, would do little to thwart the Administration's war on drugs.' 39 Although the majority mechanically stated
person on board buses and trains ('that time permits') and check identification
[and] tickets, [and] ask to search luggage-all in the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement ...."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989)
(quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987))).
131. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority did not find it necessary to decide
whether a seizure had occurred. Id. at 2388.
132. Id. at 2392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor acknowledged that analysis in her majority opinion: "The Florida Supreme Court, whose decision we review
here, stated explicitly the factual premise for its decision." Id. at 2384. She followed that
statement with a verbatim transcription of the court's fact statement. Id. Justice
O'Connor chose, however, to characterize the Florida Supreme Court's decision as an
incorrect application of an erroneous per se rule. Id. at 2389.
134. Id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554-55 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
135. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2393-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). To gauge the general inefficiency of suspicionless
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that individual rights should not fall victim to policy-fueled police
power,' 40 Justice Marshall drew little comfort from the Court's
platitudes. He closed his dissent by noting that "the majority's actions ... speak louder than its words."' 4
IV.

ANALYSIS

14 2

"War creates consent."
These words, written only ten weeks
before the Court handed down its decision in Florida v. Bostick,
launched their author, Andrew Kopkind, into an analysis of the
"warrior state," a model that he uses to explain our nation's current approach to domestic policy issues.'4 3 For Terrance Bostick,
war also created consent. In his case, the "war on drugs" tacitly
justified the finding that he provided voluntary consent to a search
of his luggage.
The Court's decision in Bostick is the latest blow to individual
liberty in the name of the government's "war on drugs."'" By
placing its imprimatur on intrusive police tactics, the Court has
allowed a return to the witch-hunt mentality of the 1950s.14' Forty
years later, however, it is the snow-white spectre of cocaine that
has replaced the red scare of communism.' 4 6 Once again, civil libbus searches, see United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990) (reporting
that a single officer's search of 100 buses netted only 7 arrests).
140. Bostick, 11 S. Ct. at 2389.
141. Id. at 2395 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Andrew Kopkind, Imposing the New Order at Home; The Warrior State; US.
Social Problems May Be Handled Like an InternationalMilitary Campaign, 1991 THE
NATION, at 433.

143. Kopkind argues that the United States has been "in a state of war-cold, hot,
and lukewarm" for the last fifty years. Id. The "warrior state," he contends, "has so
saturated everyday ideology ... that government is practically unthinkable without it."
Id. at 434. He suggests that because people are easier to govern in a time of war, it
behooves those in power to sustain a perpetual "warrior state." Id. at 435-36. At home,
he continues, the "warrior state" manifests itself in the "war on drugs" and the "war on
crime." Id. at 448.
144. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (decrying the "drug exception to the Constitution"); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by
the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1986); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown:
The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987).
145. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding seditious speech
convictions of the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
United States based on a markedly diluted "clear and present danger" standard). See
generally DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER
TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978) (discussing the nation's intolerance of Communism

in the 1940S and 1950s).
146. In its 1989 and 1990 terms, the Court discarded the need for individualized
suspicion in three cases closely linked to the drug war: Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481
(1990) (upholding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints); National Treasury Em-
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erties fall by the wayside in the name of a search-and-destroy
war. 47 Like the McCarthy campaign, this war is being fought to
build political reputations.' 48 In the words of Santayana, "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."' 149
Although the Bush Administration uses vivid war imagery to
describe America's struggle against drugs,150 colorful language is
not an end in itself. By painting a blood-and-guts picture on an
olive drab canvas, the Administration has successfully depicted the
drug problem as the gravest threat to our nation since communism.'
The nation should take little comfort in the President's
assurance that the war on drugs is a just war, 15 2 because the advoployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (concluding that suspicionless drugtesting of certain Customs Service employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding
that suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment). See also Lacayo, supra note 6, at 28 (providing that "'[w]hen you start
saying a search satisfies the Fourth Amendment even though it's not based on any focused suspicion at all, you've ripped the heart out of the Fourth Amendment'" (quoting
University of Michigan law professor Yale Kamisar)).
147. See MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE-U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
TIMES OF WAR 2 (1990) ("Rather than being an exception, war-era violations of civil
liberties in the United States are the accepted norm for our government.").
148. See Brian Duffy, Now, for the Real Drug War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
11, 1989, at 18 ("There is also political benefit to taking on cocaine crooks. Republican
pollster Richard Wirthlin says drugs are hot, the rough equivalent of Americans' concern
over inflation in 1981.").
149. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1921).
150. See supra note 2.
151. Bush Address, Sept. 5, 1989, supra note 2, at 1136 ("Our most serious problem
today is cocaine, and in particular, crack."); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 2; see also JAMES T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
RESTRAINT OF WAR at xxxi-xxxiv (1981). According to Johnson, the just war model
establishes parameters for making "relative moral decisions." Id. at xxxiii. The decisions
will invariably involve the following questions: (1) Should this war be waged?; and (2) To
what extent should the war be prosecuted? Id. at xxxiv.
The President has answered the first question in the affirmative. See Bush Address,
Sept. 5, 1989, supra note 2, at 1136-40. The text of that address also suggests his answer
to the second question. President Bush explained that "our nation has zero tolerance for
casual drug use" and even less for "drug kingpins"--convicted kingpins will get the death
penalty. Id. at 1138-39.
Exactly one year later, with American troops deploying to the Persian Gulf, the President's answer to the second question became clearer. He offered these thoughts during a
White House briefing:
My administration will remain on the front lines until [the drug crisis] is licked
for good. Block by block, school by school, child by child, we will take back the
streets. We will never surrender. I know that other subjects are preoccupying
all of us these days. But this one remains number one. It will continue to
remain number one when the international situation has calmed down ....
Remarks at a White House Briefing on National Drug Control Strategy, II 1990 PuB.
PAPERS 1187, 1188 (Sept 5, 1990).
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cate who frames the issues for debate generally is trying to control
the subsequent argument.'53 George Bush has convinced the nation that drugs are an enemy to be conquered at any cost. His
recurring use of martial metaphors has numbed many to the dangers of an encroaching police state.5 4 That government demands
order, uniformity, and consent during wartime is no novel concept.' 55 That it creates a metaphorical war to facilitate, if not compel, compliance is reprehensible.
Although the Bostick opinion is wholly consistent with the Bush
Administration's crackdown on drugs, it is inconsistent with both
the record in this case and the Court's prior pronouncements involving the "reasonable person" test.' 56 First, as Justice Marshall
noted in dissent, the Florida Supreme Court did not employ a
mechanized per se rule, suppressing evidence solely because Bostick's encounter took place on a bus.' 517 As evidenced by its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court pored over the facts, deciding the
case in view of all the circumstances. 158
Second, notwithstanding the Court's reformulation of the Mendenhall "reasonable person" test,'5 9 the majority erred by refusing
to find that Bostick was seized unlawfully. 160 Instead, the Court
emphasized the trial court's finding that the officers informed Bos153.

See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE AD§ 7.32, at 145 (1985) ("The importance of the framing of the issues cannot be
overemphasized. How the [audience] perceive[s] the issues in the case will to a large
extent determine how . . . [the case] is resolved.").
154. In United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), Judge Ferguson addressed this reality in his dissent: "Invoking the metaphors
and images of battle, the government's 'war on drugs' has already made casualties of
constitutional protections and personal dignity."
155. See RANDOLPH BOURNE, The State, in WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS 65
(Carl Resek ed. 1964). Bourne explains:
The machinery of government sets and enforces the drastic penalties, the minorities are either intimidated into silence, or brought slowly around by a subtle
process of persuasion which may seem to them really to be converting them....
[T]he nation in war-time attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values
culminating at the undisputed apex of the state ideal, which could not possibly
be produced through any other agency than war.
Id. at 71.
156. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
157. Florida v. Bostick, I ll S. Ct. 2382, 2391-92 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. In addition to his criticism of the
majority's reasoning, Justice Marshall faulted the Florida Supreme Court for narrowing
the certified question to the extent that it overlooked certain details of the encounter.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. See supra notes I I 1-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
VOCACY
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tick that he was free to withhold consent. 6 ' This myopic fixation
blurred the critical issue: If Bostick was already seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officers requested
permission to search his bags, his
consent was tainted, rendering
62
the subsequent search unlawful.
Equally troubling was the Court's inability to distinguish Terrance Bostick's bus encounter from the factory surveys at issue in
INS v. Delgado. 63 Indeed, more than anything else, it was the
Court's expansive reading of Delgado that sounded the death knell
for Bostick's case. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would have
been better served had the Bostick majority reread Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Delgado.'61 Although it garnered no accolades from civil libertarians, Justice Powell's Delgado opinion was
65
narrowly tailored to the facts and issues before the Court.
In light of Justice Marshall's reputation as a fierce champion of
individual rights, it was no surprise that the Bostick dissent flowed
from his pen. What was surprising, and perhaps more telling, was
an amicus brief filed by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement,
161. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385, 2388. The majority also stated that a simple refusal
to cooperate does not generate "the minimal level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure." Id. at 2387. But see Taylor, supra note 60. Taylor cautioned:
[T]ravelers who exercise their theoretical right not to be searched are sure to
become instant suspects. Police will strain to detect or invent signs of nervousness, which can then be bootstrapped into a "reasonable suspicion" and used to
justify an involuntary search if their quarry cannot be bullied into "consenting."
Some officers have said they phone ahead to suggest further scrutiny of uncooperative sorts at the next stop.
Id. at 4. Commenting on this practice during the Florida v. Bostick oral argument, Justice Scalia stated that although it "could be police harassment .... it would have nothing
to do with whether there's been a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Justice Antonin
Scalia, Remarks at Oral Argument in Florida v. Bostick (Feb. 26, 1991), reprinted in
Taylor, supra note 60, at 4.
162. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Wong Sun Court
phrased the threshold test for admissibility in the following way: "[W]hether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Id. at 488 (citation omitted). Assuming,
arguendo, that Bostick's consent was tainted by an illegal seizure, the cocaine discovered
during the search would be the tainted "fruit of a poisonous tree" and thus inadmissible
as evidence against Bostick.
163. 466 U.S. 210 (1984); see supra note 118.
164. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
165. In Delgado, Justice Powell stated that the question of whether the INS factory
sweeps resulted in any Fourth Amendment seizures was "a close one... turn[ing] on a
difficult characterization of fact and law." Id. (Powell, J., concurring in result). Noting
the government's substantial interest in curbing the flow of undocumented aliens, Justice
Powell contended that even if the INS surveys were seizures, they were reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 222-24 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
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Inc. ("AELE").16 6 AELE is a not-for-profit citizens' organization
that has filed amicus briefs with the Court on eighty-five separate
occasions. 67 Every one of those briefs sided with police interests. 68 However, AELE's amicus brief in Floridav. Bostick argued
that the encounter at issue amounted to an unreasonable seizure of
70
Bostick. 69 Moreover, presaging Justice Marshall's dissent,
AELE argued that suspicionless bus sweeps violate the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. ' 7' Although an unusual ally for Justice Marshall, in Bostick, AELE was fully aligned with the now-retired jurist.
Suspicionless bus interdictions are strategically designed and
routinely executed and in no way resemble the unpredictable encounters the Court foresaw when it fashioned the case-by-case
analysis in Terry. 7 1 Consequently, the Bostick Court should have
announced a prophylactic rule barring the practice altogether. The
Fourth Amendment should forbid stops based on criteria that do
not distinguish actual suspects from innocent travelers. 7 3 By refusing to prohibit suspicionless bus sweeps, the Court has placed its
imprimatur on the use of oppressive police power. The Bostick decision will not shorten the drug war by even a day. It will, however, effectively truncate the ever-shrinking scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
V.

IMPACT

Bostick provides law enforcement with an additional weapon for
its anti-drug arsenal. It is the latest in a long line of Supreme
Court decisions to expand police power at the expense of individ166. AELE "is interested in establishing a body of law making the police effort more
effective, in a constitutional manner. It seeks to improve the operation of the police function to protect our citizens in their life, liberties, and property, within the framework of
the various State and Federal Constitutions." Motion to File Brief and Brief Amicus
Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at *7, Bostick (No. 89-1717)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief, AELE].
167. Amicus Brief, AELE, at *7.
168. Respondent's Brief at *33, Bostick (No. 89-1717).
169. Amicus Brief, AELE, at *8-* 10. Commenting on the AELE's unusual position,
Yale Kamisar quipped, "If this isn't cause for alarm, it is hard to know what is." 60
U.S.L.W. 2253, 2258 (Oct. 22, 1991) (summarizing the 1991 United States Law Week
Constitutional Law Conference).
170. See supra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
171. Amicus Brief, AELE, at *12. AELE contended that "[w]henever a mass detention and questioning of travelers is contemplated, there must be a requirement of an
objective (though minimal) indicia of criminal activity." Id.
172. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
173. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
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ual liberty.' 74 By upholding the constitutionality of suspicionless
bus sweeps, the Court left the door open for stepped-up state intrusion into personal affairs.' 75

In addition, the Court's latest statement on the consent-coercion
question implicitly credits the "reasonable person" with an inordinate amount of Fourth Amendment knowledge.' 76 Without a detailed understanding of search and seizure law, it is highly
improbable that a reasonable person in Terrance Bostick's position
would feel free to terminate an encounter with the armed officers.' 77 Faced with circumstances often much less compelling
than those before the Bostick Court, numerous trial court judges,
applying the Mendenhall test, have struck down suspicionless bus
encounters. 178 Whether those encounters would be deemed consensual under the new Delgado-Bostick standard is unknown.
Also unknown is the degree to which law enforcement will push
the Bostick reasoning. Since six Justices viewed Bostick's confine174. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (allowing "good-faith" searches
despite Fourth Amendment violations); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (allowing
"inevitable discovery" seizures); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (allowing "totality
of circumstances" search warrants); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing "stop and
frisk"); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (allowing hearsay warrants); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (allowing hearsay arrests).
This list is by no means an all-encompassing survey of constitutional police powers.
Nor were all of the decisions cited above drug cases. These cases simply highlight a slow
but steady extension of law enforcement's reach.
175. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court offered this timeless
caveat:
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 635.
176. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
177. See James P. Graham, The Bus Stops Here, RECORDER, Nov. 7, 1991, at 6.
Graham contends that the practice of "working the buses" enables police officers to exert
their will over the passengers. Id. Because many interstate bus passengers are from society's lower class, they are more likely to be intimidated by a show of authority. Id. As
Graham points out, "there are probably not too many constitutional scholars or civil
rights lawyers traveling on buses similar to the one on which Bostick was riding." Id.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 742 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (D.D.C. 1990); United
States v. Chandler, 744 F. Supp. 333, 335-36 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Cothran,
729 F. Supp. 153, 155-56 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 207-08 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp.
784, 786-87 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Madison,
744 F. Supp. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ment as the natural result of his decision to travel by bus, the "free
to leave" language of the Mendenhall test was found inapposite to
the Court's analysis. 17 9 In its brief, AELE expressed difficulty envisioning a Bostick-type sweep of business-class passengers on a
commercial airline flight. I "° Regrettably, the Bostick decision drew
no such line in the sand.'' It follows from the Court's reasoning
that any individual who chooses to travel by commercial jet necessarily chooses confinement. So, too, does the person who enters an
elevator or a bathroom stall. Whether interrogation in these settings will become the latest tactic in the drug war remains to be
seen. Florida v. Bostick does little to allay the concerns of citizens
who cherish the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bostick decision legitimizes intrusive police action in furtherance of the "war on drugs." It is the latest in a line of postTerry decisions that chips away at the Fourth Amendment right to
be "secure ...against unreasonable searches and seizures.""12'

Af-

ter Bostick, bus passengers must choose either to carry on their
luggage or their constitutional rights, but not both.
MATTHEW

I. FARMER

179. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991).
180. Amicus Brief, AELE, at *11.
181. The Court maintained that the Fourth Amendment inquiry in Bostick would
have been handled the same way had the search taken place on a train, plane, or city
street. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2388.
182. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

